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In this paper we deal with two questions, (i) what are the origins of the current financial 
crisis, and (ii) what did economists contribute, or why did economists fail to provide a 
convincing answer for the origins of the crisis, and possible solutions to overcome it? 
Apparently, the economics profession was unaware of the looming worldwide financial and 
economic crisis, and significantly underestimated its global dimensions and consequences. A 
first and preliminary analysis is undertaken to explore reasons for these failures. We 
conclude by pointing to some consequences for economics as well as for economic policy. 
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1  Introduction 
Currently, we are observing one of the most severe and deep world financial and economic 
crises in history. The most important economies (like those of the United States, China, India, 
Japan, Germany, and Britain) are in deep recession and we also observe a severe financial 
crisis, e.g., mistrust between the financial institutions. This caused a reaction in which almost 
all governments engaged in substantial deficit spending to inject liquidity into financial mar-
kets and to fight the economic downswing. All this happened within half a year to nine 
months, and economic researchers are now confronted with explaining how this could have 
happened. The public and politicians ask the economics profession, what the causes of this 
deep crisis were and what can be done to overcome it. 
In this contribution, we try to provide some preliminary answers. In Section 2, some remarks 
are given on the origins of the financial crisis. Section 3 then deals with the role played by 
economists during the events of the recent past. Section 4 points to the failure of our eco-
nomic models, and finally, in Section 5, some conclusions for economics as well as economic 
policy are drawn.  
2  Some Remarks on the Origins of the Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis which had its origins in the United States and the induced worldwide eco-
nomic crisis pose two important questions: 
(1)  What caused the crisis? 
(2)  What should be done to minimize the risk of repetition if not of identical events than of at 
least something similar? 
A more parsimonious way of turning around these two questions is the following: If in retro-
spect the causes of this crisis are so obvious, why did so many smart researchers (and espe-
cially economists) fail to appreciate the gravity of the situation beforehand? One could imag-
ine that with sufficient preparation, these problems (financial and economic) would have been 
addressed well before the seriousness of the current crises had become apparent. It is report-
ed
1) that former US Treasury Secretary HENRY PAULSON tabled a plan for re-organizing and 
consolidating the supervision and the regulation of the US financial system. One might simi-
larly imagine that, sooner or later, federal agencies would have extended insurance to money 
market, mutual funds, and investment banks, but they remain unregulated so far. Early action 
would have brought on the regulatory umbrella. But such major changes in regulatory policy 
take time – even now (June 2009) it is not clear what type of regulatory framework will be 
implemented ultimately.  
At the most basic level, the subprime crisis resulted from the tendency of financial normalisa-
tion and innovation to run ahead of financial regulation, as EICHENGREEN (2008:  3) argues. 
For a long time, deregulation was the order of the day not only outside but also within finan-
cial markets, as illustrated, for example, by eliminating the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions 
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on mixing investment and commercial banking.
2) However, considering what had happened, 
the problem was that other (regulatory) policies were not adapted to the new environment. 
Conglomerization takes time. In the short-run, investment banks were allowed to lever-up 
their bets, they “stood” completely beyond the purview of the regulators. As independent enti-
ties funded themselves on a short-term basis, they were vulnerable to liquidity “crunches” and 
disruptions to their funding. A crisis sufficient to threaten the financial system ultimately pre-
cipitated the inevitable consolidation.
3)  
A second major element of the crisis was a consumer spending boom from 2002 to 2007 and 
the resulting domestic and international imbalances. The Bush administration cut taxes, caus-
ing a massive deficit for the government
4). The Federal Reserve cut interest rates in response 
to the 2001 recession. In addition to this action, the new financial innovations made credit 
even cheaper and more widely available.
5) This, of course, is just one, but nevertheless a ma-
jor element in the “crisis” story, contributing in its own way to the collapse of the market for 
subprime mortgages. Such loans were packaged, “securitized” and pushed by the subsidiaries 
of Lehman Brothers and other major financial institutions. The result was increased US con-
sumer spending and the decline of measured household savings into negative territory.  
The third element was financial internationalization. Much as with the separation of invest-
ment from commercial banking, the Great Depression led to the imposition of tight and per-
sistent restrictions on international capital flows. From the 1970s on, these restrictions have 
gradually been relaxed, which was another indication that policy makers had forgotten the 
Great Depression. Deregulation continued and accelerated during the 1990s.
6) Facilitating US 
dependence on foreign finance and feeding in this way the country’s credit boom helped to set 
the stage for what followed from 2007 on. What additionally helped to set the stage for the 
crisis were the rise of China and the decline of investment in Asia following the 1997 -- 1998 
currency crisis. With China saving on average nearly 50% of its GNP, this “money” more or 
less had to go abroad.
7) A great part of it went into US Treasury securities and the obligations 
of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac. These capital in-
flows “propped” up the dollar.
8) It reduced the cost of borrowing for Americans on some es-
timates by as much as 100 basis points, encouraging them to live far beyond their financial 
 
  2. See, for example, EICHENGREEN (2008a) or KROZNER and RAJAN (1994, 1997). 
 3.  See  EICHENGREEN (2008a). 
  4. However, comparing the enormous deficit spending, the Obama administration is now undertaking, the one 
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means.
9) This behaviour created an opportunistic market for Freddy, Fannie and for other fi-
nancial institutions, creating substitutes for those agency’s own securities.  
To sum up: In the United States the financial crisis was facilitated by policies of domestic and 
international liberalization accompanied by however well-intended financial innovations, 
such as complex derivative securities, “conduits” and “structured investment vehicles”, which 
were not regulated at all. Other innovations in risk management worked in the same direction. 
According to EICHENGREEN (2008a, 2008b), commercial banks, investment banks and hedge 
funds were encouraged by the dynamic development of the financial market to use more lev-
erage and their counterparties were inspired to provide it by the development of mathematical 
models and methods to quantify and hedge risks. These new models, which were rigorous and 
promised to provide “exact” information emboldened market participants to believe that the 
additional leverage was safe since participants now used scientific techniques and were con-
vinced that they could manage it.  
A major problem was, however, that these “new” models were estimated using data from re-
cent periods of low volatility over, typically, relatively short intervals, given that the financial 
instruments, whose returns being modelled, had existed only for a few years. Events, which 
should have been modelled or simulated, like a sharp drop in housing prices, were outside the 
sample period and, hence, were not captured by these models.
10) Institutional investors con-
vinced themselves on the basis of these models that their financial practices were relatively 
safe. They persuaded the public regulatory agencies to allow financial institutions to use these 
models when deciding how much capital to hold to provision against risk.
11)  
This short analysis is by no means a complete or comprehensive explanation for the financial 
crisis. Other authors, such as EICHENGREEN (2008, 2008a), ACEMOGLU (2009), ADAMS 
(2009), or CONGLETON (2009), emphasize other factors (not testing the economic models out-
of-sample, relying on trust or mistrust, and placing too much confidence in the market's ad-
justment capacity, for example). 
3  The Financial Crisis and the Role of Economists 
The global financial (and economic) crisis has created an urgent need to fundamentally re-
think how financial systems are functioning and how they are regulated. The worldwide fi-
nancial collapse leads, in our opinion, also to a quite clear systematic criticism of the econom-
ics profession. Over the past three decades economists have developed and relied on models 
that by and large disregard key-factors (e.g., heterogeneity of decision rules, revisions of fore-
casting results and strategies, and changes in the social world) that influence the outcomes of 
financial products as well as those supplied by other markets. Moreover, the work of main-
stream economists has crowded out research on major causes of the current financial crisis. 
There has also been little scientific exploration of early indicators of this systemic crisis and 
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of potential ways of preventing the crisis from developing to a worldwide one. In fact, if one 
looks through the academic literature of macroeconomics and finance, the possibility of a 
systemic crisis (i.e., one leading to a collapse of the global economy) appears like a futuristic 
and unrealistic event that is absent from our economic models. Most economic models offer 
no explanation for such a crisis and, hence, provide no strategy for defeating it.
12) 
The implicit view behind our standard models is that markets and economies are inherently 
stable and that they only temporarily deviate from this stability and equilibrium. Thus, we 
overestimated the capacity of markets to correct disequilibria or at least underestimated the 
social costs that are caused by such corrections. Hardly anybody, neither politicians nor scien-
tists, expected, for example, the consequences of Lehman Brothers's bankruptcy – or the 
back-out of Bear Stearns. Otherwise, that institution probably would have been saved. Hence, 
the majority of economic researchers failed to warn policy makers about the possibilities of a 
systemic financial crisis and ignored the work of those, such as, KRUGMAN and STIGLITZ, who 
did.
13)  
Ironically, as the systemic financial crisis developed, economists had no choice but to aban-
don their models and their trust in markets, and they could “only” produce common-sense 
economic advice recommending massive government intervention. Common-sense advice, 
which may sometimes be quite useful, is a poor substitute for a theoretically derived and em-
pirically tested model that can provide urgently needed policy advice, for example, in the area 
of financial regulation. It is simply not enough to argue that existing models do not foresee 
such a crisis; what we need are models accommodating the possibility of such systemic finan-
cial crises. That we do not yet have such models is astonishing because we experienced a 
number of somewhat smaller but, nevertheless, important financial crises before (in Asia, 
Mexico, Russia, the United States, and so on), that already had had tremendous impacts on 
the economies in the countries involved.
14)  
One explanation for this failure goes back to the profession’s methodological roots. The of-
ten-expressed worldview of economic researchers, namely that they are mostly concerned 
with the allocation of scarce resources, can be short-sighted and misleading. It reduces the 
work of economists to the study of optimal decisions in well-specified problems of individual 
choice. The danger in such research is that it loses track of the (sometimes unstable) dynamics 
of economic systems. Without an adequate understanding of these dynamic economic (espe-
cially financial) processes, one is likely to miss important factors that influence the economic 
system (especially decision-making). The use of the standard and traditional economic models 
often leads researchers to neglect questions about the stability of the system, a missing coor-
dination of key actors resulting in the possibility of system failures.  
 
 12. Compare REINHART and ROGOFF (2008) as well as COLANDER et al. (2009). 
 13. Compare KRUGMAN (2000, 2004) and STIGLITZ (2008, 2009).  
 14. What is additionally surprising is the long academic legacy of economic studies of crisis phenomena, which 
can be found in the work of LEIJONHUFVUD (2000), KINDLEBERGER (1989) and MINSKY (1986), just to 
name a few prominent examples. 5 
 
One might even put forward the hypothesis that economic researchers have been captured into 
a sup-optimal equilibrium in which much of their research efforts are not directed towards the 
most prevalent needs of society. Quite often, the most relevant economic problems in our so-
cieties are not addressed; hence, our profession bears part of the responsibility for the current 
crisis. We have failed to provide as much insight or knowledge into the workings of the econ-
omy as possible (here, especially, the financial markets) for the good of a society.  
Many of financial economists, who developed the theoretical models, which were then used 
in actual practice, were well aware of their models’ strong and highly unrealistic assumptions 
or restrictions, which had to be made to ensure stability. According to COLANDER et al. (2009: 
3), financial economists gave little warning to the public about the fragility or instability of 
their models. There are a number of possible explanations why they did not warn the public. 
One is a lack of understanding, which is not a good explanation, because then these financial 
researchers did not know that their models were unstable or fragile. If it is true, what is quite 
often said, that financial economists are extremely bright, then they should have understood 
the limitations of their models. A second explanation is that they did not think that it is their 
task to warn the public about the fragility of these models. In our opinion, however, “econo-
mists, as all other social scientists, have an ethical responsibility to communicate the limita-
tions of the models and the potential misuse of their research” (COLANDER et al (2009: 4). 
4  The Failure of Economic Models 
Most economic (especially textbook) models, which are applied to the study of the allocation 
of scarce resources, are predominantly of a representative-agent type. Financial market mod-
els operate by letting this representative agent manage his financial affairs as one constraint 
on his utility-maximization objective over his (infinite) expected lifespan and assigning “cor-
rect” probabilities to all possible future events. In the finance world (at least on its practical 
side), mathematical portfolio and risk management models have served as  academic justifica-
tions for the tremendous increase in trading volumes and the proliferation of “exotic” finan-
cial instruments. What was and still is a big problem in using these models is that, unfortu-
nately, historical data were hardly available in most cases, meaning that the researcher had to 
rely on simulations, quite often with relatively arbitrary assumptions on correlations between 
risk and default probabilities. This makes the empirical validation of these theories question-
able.  
There is, however, also a deeper problem involved. It is well known since the famous contri-
bution of MANDELBROT (1963) that financial time series have fat tails, i.e. that, given the 
mean and (if it exists at all) the variance of the series, the probability of extreme events is 
higher than if the data-generating process were normal. This should make those working with 
such models attentive to the possibility of unusual events. It is, however, difficult to take them 
into account if they did not occur for decades, even if one bears in mind that, however small 
the probability is, such an event might nevertheless occur. However, it is practically impossi-
ble to live with and always to take into account the worst scenario possible. This holds for 6 
 
                                                          
general people, but for financial analysts as well, and it should have induced them to take 
these risks into account. 
A further somewhat different aspect of failure of the economic models in finance is the danger 
of the illusion of control mechanisms. The mathematical rigor, elegance and the numerical 
precision of the various risk-management and asset-pricing tools have a tendency to “hide” 
the weaknesses of these models and their underlying assumptions, which are necessary to 
guarantee the models’ values to those who have not developed them. Naturally, theoretical 
models always are only approximations of real-world situations. In the last decade, some pro-
gress has been made in developing more refined models. However, as such models better cap-
ture the volatility of markets and generate “better” predictions; this might again contribute to 
strengthening the control illusion of the naive user.  
Many economic models are built upon the dual assumption of rational expectations and of a 
representative agent. Rational-expectations models assume that the individuals base their 
forecasts on the knowledge of the (true) structure of the economic system. A behavioural in-
terpretation of this assumption is that the individuals (including the economists) have a com-
plete understanding of the economic mechanisms by which the world operates. This has the 
consequence that the new and perhaps better insights about how individuals actually form 
their expectations from applied research in psychology and behavioural economics cannot be 
incorporated within rational expectation models, as everything is predetermined and no lee-
way is left for imperfect knowledge and adaptive adjustments. Thus, as COLANDER et al. 
(2009: 7) argue, despite its many refinements, rational expectation models are not at all an 
approach to decision-making that has been confirmed empirically. Indeed, Colander et al. 
(2005), along with LO et al. (2005) and COATES and HERBERT (2008), have shown that finan-
cial markets are influenced by emotional factors. Moreover, the rational expectations model 
has made economics blind to the role of interactions (e.g., trust!) between actors. Indeed, 
some work on contagion and herding behaviour,
15) which is closely connected to the network 
structure of the economy, has not been incorporated into orthodox economic models. 
5  Conclusions for Economics as well as for Economic Policy 
Recent decades were times of deregulation and privatization, based on economists' ideas. No 
other social science had such a tremendous impact on the development of our societies. How-
ever, the results are mixed; financial markets are by far the most important, but supply just 
one example that deregulation and/or privatisation did not produce the promised benefits for 
the citizens. Thus, we need new regulations. This does not necessarily imply more but defi-
nitely better regulation. Two important points might be mentioned in this respect: 
•  One of the most undesirable consequences of the financial crisis is that those who have 
been responsible for the failure of big banks like UBS in Switzerland do not bear full re-
sponsibility. Without state intervention, this bank would be bankrupt. Thus, the sharehold-
ers would lose all their money, and the managers would lose their jobs, without any 
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golden handshake, of course. State intervention is, however, necessary because such banks 
are "too big to fail" and their bankruptcy would cause tremendous economic and social 
problems for the respective societies. This insulates those who are responsible, at least 
partially, from these losses. And it creates the wrong incentives; it seduces private deci-
sion makers to accept too large risks. (At least) two solutions for this problem are being 
discussed today. One possibility is to break up these banks into smaller units so that their 
bankruptcies do not cause major problems for their countries, as is the case today with re-
spect to small private as well as public banks. An alternative is to find rules for the bank-
ruptcy of such banks that preserve the interests of their customers and, therefore, maintain 
trust in the financial system, but let the shareholders lose all their money and the higher 
level managers their jobs. Today, it is an open question as to what the better alternative is, 
but it is an important task for financial economists to develop rules that might answer that 
important question. 
•  In the current crisis, as well as in the new economy crises of eight years ago, many pen-
sioners lost part -- and some even all of their capital-based retirement accounts. Capital-
based pensions have been promoted by economists as not only having higher return but 
also being safer than pay-as-you-go pensions because of the political risks connected with 
the latter. Today we see that – not surprisingly – the higher return on a capital-based sys-
tem also brings with it a higher risk. To regain the trust of the general public in the capital-
based system we have to re-think the risks of those systems and their reallocation of those 
risks across generations. 
More generally, we have to re-think the proper role of the government in our society. Tradi-
tional public finance concentrated on market failures and neglected government failures. Pub-
lic choice theory, on the other hand, emphasizes government failure and (at least very often) 
neglects market failure. In the recent decades of deregulation and privatisation the latter ap-
proach was politically much more influential than the former. In Europe this was due to a 
large extent to the institutions of the European Union, especially its Supreme Court. Some 
economists even dreamed of an even much more reduced role for government in the future.
16) 
A rational approach will take both market- as well as government failure into account and it 
will probably assign to the government a still limited, but nevertheless more far reaching role 
than many public choice scholars believe to be appropriate. Whatever economists think, how-
ever, in a democracy, political decisions about the role of the government will be taken by the 
citizens or their representatives, respectively, and the economists whose reputations have been 
damaged considerably will have to work hard to further convince them that the role of the 
government should remain limited. 
In this respect, we also have to ask what the government can do to fight economic crises. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, the period of the so-called Neoclassical Synthesis, when we all were 
Keynesians, many economists believed strongly in the ability of government to “fine-tune” 
the business cycle. This conviction was destroyed in the 1970s when rational-expectations 
economics, including real business cycle theory, took off on its triumphal course. The latter 
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has been rejected empirically, but the sustained economic growth of the last decade made 
many believe that progress is sustainable without cycles and will, perhaps, be the prospect for 
the future. Already with the new economy crises, but at least with the current financial and 
economic crisis, this illusion burst. Without assuming that we are suddenly all Keynesians 
again, in recent months there has hardly been any resistance to Keynesian-type fiscal pro-
grammes in most countries. But this is not the end because, as mentioned above, we do not 
have a good theory on which sound political responses could be based. Thus, one of our tasks 
is to develop such a theory 
Finally, at least for some European countries, it is necessary to find a new balance between 
the financial sector and other sectors of the economy that produce goods. Iceland is the most 
extreme example, but Ireland is another one, and Switzerland also has problems in this re-
spect. Dependence on the highly volatile financial sector exposes a small economy to very 
high risk. What ACEMOGLU (2009: 4) demands for the United States holds even more so for 
these small countries: "skilled labour should be re-allocated away from the financial industry 
towards more innovative sectors."  
Taking all this into account, we should, however, not forget some basic economic lessons. 
First, besides the necessity of fighting the current crisis we should take into account the long-
run consequences of our measures. Times of crises, with huge public “investment” pro-
grammes, are ideal environments for rent-seeking and lobbying.
17) In Germany, for example, 
huge subsidies are now given to Opel, a subsidiary company of General Motors, the problems 
of which have almost nothing to do with the current financial and economic crisis. Moreover, 
several billions of Euros are used for “scrap” premia, i.e., financial incentives to trade in cars 
that are at least nine years old. This measure makes neither economic nor ecologic sense, and 
the straw fire sparked by it will soon die out without contributing anything to solve Germany's 
problems of automobile production overcapacity. On the other hand, such measures impose 
burdens on future generations, reduce future growth chances, and only minimally improve the 
current economic situation.  
Second, history tells us that severe economic crises tempt nations to adopt protectionist meas-
ures. Due to the WTO rules and, for the EU’s member states, due to the strong position of its 
Supreme Court, the danger of bald protectionism is limited. However, there is a danger of 
“soft” protectionism if, for example, governments start to influence their citizens to "Buy 
American" or "Buy French". The smaller a country is, the more it will be hurt by such poli-
cies.  
Thus, even traditional economic theory supplies some advice as to how to enact sound eco-
nomic policy measures in the midst of the current crisis. However, this is not to deny that 
economists have failed to meet in our theories the expectations the general public as well as 
we ourselves had, and we should be ready to confess this. Otherwise it will be impossible to 
restore the profession’s public reputation. On the other hand, as at least the new developments 
in behavioural economics (and behavioural finance) show, the economic approach is flexible 
enough to tackle the problems we are facing. We do not need a new economics, but we have 
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to apply (and enlarge the set of) the tools available to our science in order to give sound an-
swers that will help to solve our current problems. 
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